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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 ________________________ 
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This appeal from a judgment of the District Court for the 
District of Delaware primarily presents the question whether the 
Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") had the right to levy pursuant to 
26 U.S.C. § 6321 on a bank account at the Ninth Ward Savings Bank 
("the Bank") in Wilmington, Delaware, owned jointly by appellants 
Donald Gaster and his wife Mary Ann Gaster, along with their son 
Bryan Gaster.  The IRS levied against the account in order to 
enforce a judgment for a tax deficiency obtained against Donald 
Gaster in his individual capacity.  Donald Gaster died during the 
pendency of this appeal, and his estate has challenged the 
propriety of the IRS levy.  Alleging that the property which was 
levied upon was held by her and Donald Gaster (the "Gasters") as 
tenants by the entireties, Mary Ann Gaster claimed an interest in 
property seized for another's taxes under 26 U.S.C. § 7426.   
(Bryan Gaster has waived all interest in the bank account and is 
not a party.)  
 It is unquestioned that the IRS can properly levy on the 
account if Donald Gaster, the delinquent taxpayer, had the 
unilateral right to withdraw money from the joint bank account 
under Delaware law.  The district court determined, following a 
bench trial, that Donald Gaster had a unilateral right to withdraw 
funds from the account and hence the IRS could properly levy on the 
 
 
account.  We conclude, however, that the district court erred and 
that pursuant to the Gasters' contract with the Bank and applicable 
Delaware law, both the signature of Donald and Mary Ann Gaster were 
required in order to withdraw funds from the account.  We therefore 
hold the IRS levy to be improper and reverse the judgment of the 
district court with the direction to dissolve the levy. 
 
 I.   
 On June 25, 1985, the Gasters opened an account at the 
Bank to deposit the proceeds from the sale of an apartment building 
in Secane, Pennsylvania, which they had held as tenants by the 
entireties.  When they opened the account, the Gasters transferred 
a portion of it to their son, titling in the alternative the 
account's original signature card and six-month certificate of 
deposit ("CD") -- "Donald Gaster or Mary Ann Gaster or Bryan 
Gaster."  It is undisputed that the titling of a signature card in 
the alternative allows for unilateral withdrawal from the account 
by each owner.  The district court found that the Gasters titled 
the signature card in the alternative -- which permitted access to 
the account with one signature -- because Donald Gaster would be 
unavailable due to the pendency of serious surgery.   
 On the following day, June 26, 1985, the Supreme Court 
decided United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 
105 S. Ct. 2919 (1985), holding that the determination whether a 
delinquent taxpayer has an interest in a joint bank account subject 
to a federal tax lien turns on whether the delinquent has a 
unilateral right under the applicable state law to withdraw funds 
 
 
from the account.  Shortly after the publication of the National 
Bank of Commerce opinion, the Gasters became aware of its holding 
and resolved to protect their jointly-held property from an IRS 
levy that could arise from an IRS judgment obtained against Donald 
Gaster on May 12, 1977.  To effectuate this intent, Donald Gaster 
went to the Bank in December 1985, and retitled the signature card 
to read "Donald Gaster and Mary Ann Gaster or Bryan Gaster," so 
that more than one signature would be required in order for Donald 
Gaster to withdraw funds from the jointly owned account.  Over the 
next five years (until and including the time of the IRS levy on 
August 24, 1990) all correspondence from the Bank with regard to 
the account referred to the account in this conjunctive form.   
 From the time the account had been established, the Bank 
sent a savings transfer form to the Gasters every six-months to 
authorize the roll-over of the proceeds from an expiring CD for the 
purchase of a new CD.  Even after the change in the signature card, 
Mary Gaster would return the form, with her signature alone, on 
behalf of both herself and her husband.  With the return of each 
transfer form, the account's title remained conjunctive.  No 
withdrawals of any kind have ever been made from the account.   
 On August 24, 1990, the IRS levied on the account 
pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6321 to enforce the 1977 tax deficiency 
judgment against Donald Gaster.  In response to this levy, the Bank 
filed a complaint in interpleader against the Gasters and the IRS 
in the Delaware Superior Court.  The IRS removed the interpleader 
action to the District Court for the District of Delaware, 28 
U.S.C. § 1444, invoking jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1340 
 
 
and 1345 and also 26 U.S.C. §§ 7402 and 7403.  As we have noted, 
the district court held that the IRS could levy on the account, 
deciding that Donald Gaster had a unilateral right to withdraw the 
funds.  The court concluded in a memorandum opinion that Donald 
Gaster's subsequent modification of the account signature card was 
ineffective, given that Donald Gaster alone formally executed the 
change.  This appeal followed. 
 While we review the district court's findings of fact 
under a clearly erroneous standard, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n 
Local 19 v. 2300 Group, Inc., 949 F.2d 1274, 1278 (3d Cir. 1991), 
the court's conclusion that Donald Gaster had an unrestricted 
unilateral right to withdraw the funds under Delaware law is a 
legal question over which we exercise plenary review.  Borse v. 
Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611, 613 (3d Cir. 1992); High v. 
Balun, 943 F.2d 323, 325 (3d Cir. 1991).   
 




 Section 6321 of the Code, 26 U.S.C. § 6321, provides: 
"[i]f any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay 
the same after demand, the amount . . . shall be a lien in favor of 
the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether 
real or personal, belonging to such person." 
 In National Bank of Commerce, the Supreme Court addressed 
the question of when a delinquent taxpayer's interest in a joint 
bank account constitutes "property" or "rights to property" 
 
 
pursuant to § 6321.  The Court concluded that a delinquent taxpayer 
has such an interest in property on which the IRS may levy when 
"under state law, a taxpayer has the unrestricted right to withdraw 
funds from the account."  National Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. at 
725-726, 105 S.Ct. at 2927.  Whether the delinquent has such a 
right to the funds is governed by state law, since "state law 
controls in determining the nature of the legal interest which the 
taxpayer had in the property."  Id. at 722, 105 S.Ct. at 2925 
(internal quotation omitted) ("This follows from the fact that the 
federal statute creates no property rights but merely attaches 
consequences, federally defined, to rights created under state 
law." (internal quotation omitted)).  Thus, in deciding whether the 
IRS may properly levy on the jointly-owned account at the Bank, we 
must determine whether the tax delinquent, Donald Gaster, had an 
unrestricted right to the funds in the account under Delaware law.  
 Pursuant to National Bank of Commerce, before considering 
Mary Ann Gaster's cross-claim for the return of her ownership 
interest in the proceeds of the bank account under 26 U.S.C. § 
7426, we are required to determine the propriety of the IRS levy.1  
National Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. at 728, 105 S.Ct. at 2928 ("[A] 
                     
    1   The district court found that Mary Ann Gaster's § 7426 
claim to one-half of the funds, in the alternative, as a tenant 
in common (as opposed to as a tenant by the entireties) was time 
barred in that the claim was not made within nine months of the 
date of the levy as required by 26 U.S.C. § 6532(c).  On appeal, 
looking to the pre-trial conduct and communication, the IRS has 
conceded that Mary Ann Gaster did in fact assert her § 7426 claim 
within nine months of the levy.  Given that we find the IRS levy 
was improper, we never reach the validity of Mary Ann Gaster's § 
7426 claim to one-half of the account as a tenant in common.   
 
 
levy action settles no rights in the property subject to seizure." 
(internal quotation omitted)).  If the IRS levy is determined to be 
proper, "one claiming an interest in property seized for another's 
taxes may bring a civil action [under § 7426] against the United 
States to have the property or the proceeds of its sale returned."  
Id.  Alternatively, § 6343(b) provides an administrative proceeding 
to allow a claimant a remedy for the return of seized property.  
Treas. Reg. § 301.6343-1(b)(2), 26 C.F.R. § 301.6343-1(b)(2) 
(1984).  It is only under these post-seizure proceedings that the 
ownership form of the property becomes relevant.   
 In sum, as the Court made clear in National Bank of 
Commerce, the propriety of the IRS levy turns only on right to 
withdraw, not the ownership form of the bank account.  The 
ownership form determines only the claimant's share of the seized 
property under her post-seizure claim.  National Bank of Commerce, 
472 U.S. at 728 n.11, 105 S.Ct. at 2928 n.11.  Thus, whether or not 
Donald and Mary Ann Gaster owned their share of the account as 
tenants by the entireties is relevant only if we first determine 
that the IRS levy was proper.   
 Before proceeding to that determination, it is important 
to note that in National Bank of Commerce the Supreme Court 
acknowledged that if money is held by a husband and wife in a joint 
bank account as tenants by the entireties2 under applicable state 
                     
    2  A tenancy by the entireties "is created between a husband 
and wife and by which together they hold title to the whole with 
right of survivorship so that, upon death of either, [the] other 
takes [the] whole. . . . Neither party can alienate or encumber 
the property without the consent of the other."  Black's Law 
Dictionary 1022 (6th ed. 1990). 
 
 
law "the Government could not use the money in the account to 
satisfy the tax obligations of one spouse," notwithstanding the 
propriety of the levy.  National Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. at 729 
n.11, 105 S.Ct. at 2928 n.11 (citing Raffaele v. Granger, 196 F.2d 
620, 622 (1952), which recognizes that if an account is held as 
tenants by the entireties under Pennsylvania law the IRS's "attempt 
to deal separately with or dispose of the interest of one is in 
derogation of the other spouse's ownership of the entire property 
and, therefore, legally ineffective").  Similarly under Delaware 
law, the IRS would not be entitled to the money in the account if 
the Gasters owned the account as tenants by the entireties since 
both Donald and Mary Ann Gaster would be "seized, not merely of 
equal interests, but of the whole estate during their lives and the 
interest of neither of them can be sold, attached or liened except 
by the joint act of both husband and wife."  Steigler v. Insurance 
Co. of North America, 384 A.2d 398, 400 (Del. 1978) (citation 
omitted).   
 Consequently, if a tenancy by the entireties existed, 
Mary Ann Gaster could successfully recover the entire amount in the 
account pursuant to her § 7426 (property claim) action.  However, 
while it appears that the Gasters owned their share of the account3 
                     
    3  The question of the ownership form of Donald and Mary Ann 
Gaster's share of the account is not affected by the fact that 
the account was owned along with their son Bryan.  "In 
jurisdictions where tenancies by the entirety have not been 
abolished, a tenancy by the entirety may be created [between] 
three or more persons, two of whom are husband and wife--e.g., by 
a transfer to H (husband) and W (wife), and X, in which case H 
and W take an undivided one-half interest as tenants by the 
entirety, and X takes a one-half undivided interest as tenant in 
 
 
from its establishment in June of 1985 as tenants by the entireties 
under Delaware law,4 as we have stated, we need not address this 
issue if we first determine that the IRS levy was improper. 
                                                                  
common vis-a-vis H and W."  Robert A. Cunningham et al., The Law 
of Property 204 (2d ed. 1993). 
    4  The district court made a factual finding that, when the 
account was initially established, the Gasters desired that only 
one signature be required to access the account because of Donald 
Gaster's poor health.  From that fact, the court concluded that 
the account was established as a tenancy in common.  In light of 
its finding that the change in signature card was legally 
ineffective, see discussion infra, the court also held that the 
account remained a tenancy in common even after Donald Gaster 
changed the signature card to the conjunctive.  While we need 
not, given our holding, address the question of the ownership 
form of the account, it does appear that under Delaware law 
Donald and Mary Ann Gaster's share of the account was initially 
established as a tenancy by the entireties.  That is because in 
addition to the presumption, recognized by the district court, in 
favor of a tenancy by the entireties when a joint bank account is 
opened by a husband and wife in the conjunctive form, Widder v. 
Leeds, 317 A.2d 32, 34 (Del. Ch. 1974), a more general 
presumption exists in favor of a tenancy by the entireties under 
Delaware law.  Property held by husband and wife in "Delaware and 
the majority of other jurisdictions as well" is "presumptively 
held by the entireties."  See William M. Young v. Tri-Mar Asso. 
Co., 362 A.2d 214, 215 (Del. Super. Ct. 1976).  The fact that the 
Gasters originally established the account in the alternative to 
allow for unilateral withdrawal would not negate a finding that 
the account was held as tenants by the entireties.  Under 
Delaware law a joint bank account, though in such form as to 
permit either husband or wife to draw, is a tenancy by the 
entireties, in the absence of evidence to the contrary.  Hoyle v. 
Hoyle, 66 A.2d 130, 132 (Del Ch. 1949); see also In re Griffith, 
93 A.2d 920, 922 (Del. Ch. 1953).  In addition, Delaware courts 
have discounted the significance of bank signature cards in 
determining the presence of a tenancy by the entireties.  See In 
re McCall, 398 A.2d 1210, 1215 (Del Ch. 1978) ("The purpose of 
such a card being not for the purpose of establishing ownership 
but only to guard against a payment to an unauthorized person.").  
 Moreover, the district court acknowledged that the funds in 
the account at Ninth Ward Bank originated from the sale of the 
Secane apartment building, owned by the Gasters as tenants by the 
entireties.  In Delaware proceeds of property held by a husband 




 The propriety of the IRS levy depends on whether Donald 
Gaster possessed a unilateral right of withdrawal as determined "by 
his contract with the bank, as well as by the relevant [Delaware] 
statutory provisions."  National Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. at 723, 
105 S.Ct. at 2926.  If Donald Gaster had a unilateral right to 
withdraw funds from the account, the IRS levy was proper; if he did 
not have such a right, the IRS levy was improper.  It is not 
disputed that when the joint account at the Bank was initially 
established, Donald Gaster had a unilateral right to withdraw funds 
from the account, given the original alternative form of the 
account signature card.  The issue, however, is the ability of 
Donald Gaster to unilaterally withdraw funds at the time of the IRS 
levy, after his change in the signature card, the efficacy of 
which, as we explain infra, is clear.5   
                                                                  
tenants by the entireties absent clear evidence of a contrary 
intent.  Moser v. Moser, 287 A.2d 398, 399 (Del. 1972); Widder, 
317 A.2d at 35 ("[D]irect derivatives of entireties property 
prima facie remain entireties property, even if taken in the name 
of one spouse alone."); Tri-Mar, 362 A.2d at 216.  Given this 
strong presumption, it appears Mr. and Mrs. Gaster would continue 
to hold their share of the account as tenants by the entireties. 
    5  The district court concluded that Donald Gaster changed 
the signature card at the bank in light of the Court's opinion in 
National Bank of Commerce in order to avoid a possible IRS levy 
to collect an existing deficiency judgment.  Notwithstanding this 
factual finding, the district court did not consider and the IRS 
has not argued that Donald Gaster's change in the signature card, 
in order to deny the IRS the ability to levy on the account, 
constituted a fraudulent conveyance under Delaware law.  
Arguably, such action could be viewed as a fraudulent conveyance 
under 6 Del. C. §§ 1304, 1307, in that Mr. Gaster altered the 
signature card in order to avoid collection on an existing IRS 
judgment.  While the case at bar presents a slightly different 
question, Delaware case law has found a fraudulent conveyance 
 
 
 The record provides uncontested testimony that Bank 
policy would have required the signature of both Donald and Mary 
Ann Gaster (or, alternatively, the single signature of Bryan 
Gaster) in order to make a withdrawal from the account, given the 
conjunctive signature card.  The fact that Bryan Gaster could have 
unilaterally withdrawn the funds is not relevant to our analysis 
since under National Bank of Commerce we must determine whether the 
delinquent taxpayer had a right, acting alone, to withdraw funds 
from the account.  National Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. at 728, 105 
S.Ct. at 2928.   
 The Bank has stated that it would have honored a 
withdrawal from this particular savings account by issuing a check 
payable as the account was titled -- "Donald Gaster and Mary Ann 
Gaster or Bryan Gaster."  If such a check were issued, Delaware law 
would require the signature of both Donald and Mary Ann Gaster (or 
                                                                  
when a spouse alters the ownership form of property to a tenancy 
by the entireties in order to avoid a judgment creditor.  
Harrington v. Hollingsworth, 1994 Del. Ch. LEXIS 101 (July 6, 
1994); Givens v. Givens, 1986 WL 2270 (Del. Super. 1986). 
 We cannot decide whether Donald Gaster's conduct establishes 
a fraudulent conveyance under Delaware law, however, since the 
IRS's failure to raise the issue either in the district court or 
on appeal constitutes a waiver. See Brenner v. Local 514, United 
Brotherhood of Carpenters, 927 F.2d 1283, 1298 (3d Cir. 1991) 
("It is well established that failure to raise an issue in the 
district court constitutes a waiver of the argument."); 
International Raw Materials v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 978 F.2d 1318, 
1327 n.11 (3d Cir. 1992) ("We have repeatedly emphasized that 
failure to raise a theory as an issue on appeal constitutes a 
waiver because consideration of that theory would vitiate the 
requirement of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and our 
own local rules that, absent extraordinary circumstances, briefs 
must contain statements of all issues presented for appeal, 
together with supporting arguments and citations." (internal 
quotation omitted)), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1588 (1993). 
 
 
the sole signature of Bryan Gaster) in order to negotiate the 
check.  Delaware has enacted the relevant portion of Article 3 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code which requires the signature of each 
payee when a check is issued in the conjunctive  
 
form.   
 
 An instrument payable to the order of two or 
more persons: . . . (b) if not in the 
alternative is payable to all of them and may 
be negotiated, discharged or enforced only by 
all of them. 
 
6 Del. C. § 3-116(b) (emphasis added).  Therefore, as a matter of 
Delaware law, both the signatures of Donald and Mary Ann Gaster 
were required to withdraw funds from the savings account.  Given 
that his wife's signature was also required, the delinquent 
taxpayer, Donald Gaster, did not have the ability to withdraw funds 




 Notwithstanding the fact that representatives of the Bank 
testified that they would require the signatures of both Donald and 
Mary Ann Gaster to actually make a withdrawal from the account, the 
district court refused to recognize the legal effect of the change 
in the signature card since Mary Ann Gaster never executed a 
document evidencing her assent to the change.  We disagree with the 
significance the district court placed on the failure of Mary Ann 
Gaster to formally demonstrate her consent.   
 
 
 We may conclude that Donald Gaster had the actual 
authority to act as an agent of his wife in this particular 
instance if he was acting consistent with a manifestation of 
consent by Mary Ann Gaster.  An agency relationship "'results from 
the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the 
other shall act on his behalf . . . .'"  Cox v. Deon, 1994 Del. 
Super. LEXIS 357, at *9 (July 29, 1994) (adopting the definition of 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1); see also Concors Supply Co. v. 
Giesecke, Int'l, Ltd., 1990 Del. Super. LEXIS 87, at *5 (March 5, 
1990).  Consent sufficient to establish an agency relationship 
exists not only where there is prior authorization, but also where 
a principal ratifies acts done on her behalf after the fact.  
McCabe v. Williams, 45 A.2d 503, 505 (Del. 1944); Hirzel Funeral 
Homes, Inc. v. Equitable Trust Co., 83 A.2d 700, 701 (Del. Super. 
Ct. 1951); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 100 & cmt. a ("The 
affirmance of the act of an unauthorized person by the purported 
principal, all conditions for ratification being fulfilled, 
normally has the same effect as if such person had been originally 
authorized.").  Thus, the change in the signature card is legally 
binding if Mary Ann Gaster was aware of, and ratified, the change 
done, in part, on her behalf.  
 At trial, Mary Ann Gaster testified that even though she 
failed to explicitly authorize Donald Gaster's actions before the 
fact, she manifested a general consent to his acting on her behalf. 
 Q:  Mrs. Gaster, when did you become aware that 
the accounts at Ninth Ward Savings Bank and 
Loan had been changed from Donald or Mary Ann 




 A:  I guess after Donald did it.  Being married 
to a man for 40 years, I trust anything he 
does, I agree with. 
 
 Q:  He did not consult you before he did this? 
 
 A:  I don't feel he would have to -- I mean, 
what's his is mine, and what's mine is his. 
 
In addition to her acknowledging her ratification of his actions at 
trial Mary Ann Gaster was aware of and failed to object to the 
change that her husband made in the signature card for a period of 
more than five years after the change in the card and before the 
time of the levy.  She signed on multiple occasions the saving 
transfer forms which reinvested the funds in an account where title 
was consistent with the change in the signature card -- "Donald and 
Mary Ann Gaster or Bryan Gaster."  Given these uncontested facts, 
including those that demonstrate Mary Ann Gaster's retroactive 
consent to the change in the signature card, we conclude that as a 
matter of Delaware law Mary Ann Gaster ratified the change.  See 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 83 (1958) (allowing a principal to 
ratify an agent's unauthorized prior act if he knows about it and 
fails to take affirmative steps to disavow the act).  
 In sum, we conclude that the change in the card was 
legally effective, since when Donald Gaster executed the change in 
the signature card he was acting as the agent of his wife under 
Delaware law as to her share of the account.  Buttressing this 
conclusion is the fact that Delaware law, in general, considers a 
 
 
husband and wife as agents of the other when dealing with a joint 
account.  See Hoyle v. Hoyle, 66 A.2d 130, 132 (Del. Ch. 1949).6 
                     
    6  In Hoyle, the Delaware Chancery Court was presented with 
the question whether a husband and wife could own a joint bank 
account as tenants by the entireties notwithstanding the fact 
that both spouses had the unilateral right to withdraw funds from 
the account.  The court determined that a tenancy by the entirety 
could exist even with the unilateral right of withdrawal, since 
each spouse can be viewed as acting as the agent of the other 
with regard to a joint account. 
 
 It should be noted that while the bank accounts 
here were in the names of the husband and 
wife, the money could be withdrawn by either 
the husband or the wife.  The fact that the 
money could be withdrawn by either spouse has 
been held in Pennsylvania not to defeat a 
finding of an estate by the entirety in such 
money because in such a situation each spouse 
is considered to be the agent of the other.  
This is deemed to satisfy the so-called 
"control" unity requirement of such an 
estate.  See Madden v. Gosztonyi Savings & 
Trust Co., 331 Pa. 476, 200 A. 624, 117 
A.L.R. 904 [(1938)]; Berhalter v. Berhalter, 
315 Pa. 225, 173 A. 172, 173 [(1934)]. I 
accept and adopt the reasoning and conclusion 
of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in this 
respect. 
 
Hoyle, 66 A.2d at 132 (emphasis added).  Subsequent Delaware 
cases have limited the finding of an agency relationship in the 
event that one spouse becomes incapacitated, In re Griffith, 93 
A.2d at 922-23 ("The present case is distinguished from the Hoyle 
case in that . . . the other tenant by the entireties, had been 
adjudicated an insane person . . . . The fact that the husband's 
mental or physical condition was such that he was incapable of 
transacting business would not constitute the wife as general 
agent or vest her with a general or unlimited authority as to all 
his affairs."); Barrows v. Bowen, 1994 Del. Ch. LEXIS 63, at *7 
("This disinclination to assume agency or natural guardianship is 
designed to encourage formal judicial guardianship adjudications 
which protect the interests of possibly impaired person.").  
However, the Hoyle court's finding of an agency relationship, as 
between competent spouses in dealing with a joint bank account, 






 In addition to concluding that the change in the 
signature card was ineffective, the district court also appeared to 
rely for its determination that Donald Gaster had unilateral access 
to the account on the fact that Mary Ann Gaster at times 
unilaterally executed saving transfers on the account.  Because 
only Mary Ann Gaster signed the saving transfer forms, the 
government contends that Donald Gaster really had a unilateral 
right to withdraw funds from the account, the Gasters' interests in 
the account being identical.  We disagree.  A savings transfer is 
not a withdrawal, since no money leaves the bank.  See Black's Law 
Dictionary 1104 (6th ed. 1990) (defining withdrawal as the "removal 
of money or securities from a bank or other place of deposit" 
(emphasis added)).  The ability to remove funds from the bank is 
clearly the touchstone under National Bank of Commerce.  See 
National Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. at 723, 105 S. Ct. at 2926 
(focusing on whether the delinquent "had the unqualified right to 
withdraw the full amounts on deposit in the joint accounts without 
notice to his co-depositors" (emphasis added)).  At trial, Bank 
officials clarified this distinction, stating that while the 
conjunctive signature card required the signature of both Donald 
and Mary Ann Gaster in order for either to have made a withdrawal, 
two signatures were not required to make a savings transfer, since 
the signature card only governed withdrawals.7   
                     
    7  As the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 223 makes 





 III.  
 In sum, we conclude that pursuant to the Gasters' 
contract with the Bank and applicable Delaware law, both the 
signature of Donald and Mary Ann Gaster were required in order to 
withdraw funds from the account.  Accordingly, we hold the IRS levy 
to be improper and will therefore reverse the judgment of the 
district court with the direction to dissolve the levy.  In 
addition, we will vacate as moot the judgment in favor of the IRS 
as to Mary Ann Gaster's § 7426 cross-claim, and will affirm the 
district court's judgment as to the Gasters' claim against Ninth 
Ward Savings Bank.8 
                                                                  
Correspondingly, a different case might be presented if, 
notwithstanding the conjunctive signature card and stated bank 
policy, the Gasters had a practice of making unilateral 
withdrawals which were honored by the Bank.  If such a scenario 
were presented, we would need to examine whether the parties' 
course of dealing overrode the apparent requirement, as embodied 
in the conjunctive signature card, for the signature of both 
Donald and Mary Ann Gaster in order for either to make a 
withdrawal.  On the present record, however, no such analysis is 
required since unilateral savings transfers do not constitute a 
course of dealing inconsistent with the requirement that both 
Donald and Mary Ann Gaster authorize a withdrawal from the 
account.   
    8  The Gasters filed a counterclaim against the Bank alleging 
that if Donald Gaster had unilateral access to the account, the 
Bank was negligent and/or in breach of contract in complying with 
the Gasters' instructions in retitling the signature card.  The 
Gasters reason that, if the district court correctly concluded 
that the unilateral change in the signature card was ineffective, 
then the Bank neglected a duty to inform them of the appropriate 
manner in which to properly alter the card.  The district court 
summarily rejected this claim.  The Gasters have appealed the 
district court's judgment in favor of the Bank.  Given our 




                                                                  
signature card so as to avoid the proper imposition of an IRS 
levy -- hence we need not address the Gasters' claim against the 
Bank, and we will affirm the district court's judgment in favor 
of the Bank. 
